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Scattered Clouds in the Horizon of Consensus: 
Attitudes of Portuguese Parliamentary Elites  
Towards Europe Before and After the Crisis 
Pedro T. Magalhães, João Cancela & Catherine Moury ∗ 
Abstract: »Leichte Wolken am Konsens-Horizont. Einstellungen der portugiesi-
schen parlamentarischen Eliten gegenüber Europa vor und nach der Krise«. In 
this article we analyze the evolution of the attitudes towards Europe of Portu-
guese parliamentary elites in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. Our anal-
ysis relies on interviews to a total of 227 MPs in the context of the ENEC pro-
ject in 2014 and of the Intune Project in 2009 and 2007. Our principal finding 
is that an important gap has risen between the attitudes of the MPs and of the 
masses. Indeed, while the Portuguese are becoming increasingly less pro-
European, this is not the case of their deputies. We show that, in 2014, the per-
centage of deputies that believed that EU membership benefited the country 
has decreased a little, but it stays as high as 89%. Our data, however, show that 
MPs now exhibit lower levels of trust towards the European institutions. Inter-
estingly, the drop in the levels of trust towards EU institutions does not affect 
all institutions equally: trust towards the European Parliament remains con-
stant regarding 2007, whereas the levels of trust in the remaining two institu-
tions decrease. Finally, we show that it is in the Socialist Party (PS) that there is 
the steepest decline in the level of overall trust, which is rooted in declining 
levels of confidence in the European Commission. Given that PS has tradition-
ally portrayed itself as the most pro-Europe of the Portuguese parties, this is 
solid evidence of a growing discontent with the European Commission. 
Keywords: Europe, Portugal, political elites, Europeanness, attitudes towards 
Europe.    
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1.  Introduction1 
This article aims to analyze the effects of the sovereign debt crisis on the atti-
tudes of Portuguese parliamentary elites towards the European Union (EU). It 
will do so by comparing the data from the IntUne surveys – whose latest set 
was gathered in 2009, before the full effects of the sovereign debt crisis were 
felt – with the more recent data from the ENEC2 2014 surveys (2014). 
Whilst large-scale public opinion surveys on the attitudes of European citi-
zens to the multiple aspects of European integration have been regularly con-
ducted since the 1970s (notably through the Eurobarometer surveys), data on 
the perceptions of national political elites is much scarcer. The IntUne project 
(2005-2009) filled such a gap to a certain extent. However, even if it conducted 
two waves of surveys among national political elites (in 2007 and in 2009), the 
data obviously could not elicit a meaningful longitudinal analysis. The ENEC 
surveys, in turn, provide the basis for answering pressing research questions: 
How did the perceptions of Portuguese MPs respond to the Eurozone crisis? 
Are seeds of Euroscepticism growing where an apparently robust consensus 
used to reign (Moreira et al. 2010)? Are parliamentarians following the general 
trend of public opinion, which, as the data from the Eurobarometer shows since 
November 2012 (European Commission 2012), is marked by a substantial drop 
in the indicators of citizen support for the EU? Or, on the contrary, are political 
elites functioning as a bulwark of pro-European sentiment in an unfavorable, 
but presumably transitory, context? 
These are the main questions this paper intends to answer. The Portuguese 
case is particularly relevant for an assessment of the Eurozone crisis as a poten-
tial critical juncture in the attitudes of national political elites towards European 
integration. Portugal belongs to a Southern European region which, on the one 
hand, has traditionally been described as strongly pro-European (Conti et al. 
2010) and, on the other, was most severely hit by the sovereign debt crises. 
Along with Greece (and Ireland), Portugal requested financial assistance from 
the International Monetary Fund and the EU, which was granted on the condi-
tion of agreeing to implement unpopular and far-reaching austerity measures 
(as defined in the so-called Memorandum of Understanding). Unlike Greece, 
however, Portugal did not experience an electoral earthquake between 2009 
                                                             
1  We would like to thank Pedro Tavares de Almeida and João Pedro Ruivo for comments and 
suggestions. Any errors or omissions are our sole responsibility. 
2  Acronym of the international research project ‘European National Elites and the Crisis’ that 
aims to evaluate the effects of the economic and political crisis European countries have 
been experiencing since 2008 upon the attitudes of national political elites towards the EU. 
In Portugal, the ENEC surveys were conducted under the supervision of Professor Pedro 
Tavares de Almeida and João Pedro Ruivo, with the financial support of the Portuguese In-
stitute of International Relations – Nova University of Lisbon. 
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and 2014. The parliamentary landscape suffered no extraordinary changes in 
that period, as the center-left (PS) was replaced in government by a coalition of 
the center-right (PSD, CDS-PP). Attitudinal fluctuations of the Portuguese 
parliamentary elite can, thus, not be traced back to a major re-configuration of 
the parliamentary scenario – they must be analyzed within the frame of pre-
existing, well-established parliamentary groups. 
Our approach is fourfold. Section 2 outlines, through a comparative-
historical overview, the more precise contours of the type of pro-Europeanism 
that characterized the Portuguese parliamentary elite until 2009. Section 3 deals 
with theories and hypotheses on the effects of the economic crisis on the per-
ceptions of Europe. Sections 4 and 5 present the data and our findings. And 
section 5 concludes, discussing some of the potential implications of the find-
ings in light of the aftermath of the parliamentary elections of 2015. 
2.  “Europe with Us”3 and We with Europe: Elite 
Consensus on European Integration as a Constitutive 
Feature of Portuguese Democracy 
If European integration is frequently described as an elite-driven process (Hal-
ler 2008), the history of Portugal’s accession to the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) in 1986 provides a perfect illustration of this. When, in the late 
1970s, Portugal formally applied to become a member of the EEC, most Portu-
guese citizens had little information on Europe, much less a consolidated opin-
ion on the issue of EEC membership. Accession to the EEC was a wager of the 
political elite. In the turbulent revolutionary context of 1974-75, leaders of the 
moderate parties on the left (PS) and on the right (PSD and CDS) quickly be-
came convinced that European integration was essential for the survival and 
consolidation of democracy. The European option was rooted in different mo-
tivations and logics, and not all of them overlapped. First, it implied a rupture 
with the recent authoritarian past and an alternative to the disastrous colonialist 
policies of the old regime. Second, as a club of Western liberal democracies, 
the EEC appeared to provide a safe haven from the dangers of communist 
revolution. Third, being by and large composed of advanced industrial socie-
ties, the EEC offered a clear promise of economic development and material 
well-being. To be sure, there were slight differences between the pro-European 
strategies of the two main political parties. Initially at least, the Socialist Party 
(PS) was more enthusiastic about the prospect of accession than the center-
right Social Democratic Party (PSD). However, amongst the parties with sig-
                                                             
3  Main campaign slogan of the center-left Socialist Party (PS) in the 1976 elections (Moreira 
et al. 2010, 58). 
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nificant parliamentary representation, only the communists (PCP) opposed 
accession, and they have remained very critical of European policies ever since 
– an attitude shared by their new competitor, the Left Bloc (BE), which 
emerged in the late 1990s (Moreira et al. 2010, 58-59). 
The elite’s wager proved to be largely successful, as the European option 
steadily gained the support of public opinion. If, in the early 1980s, only around 
25 per cent of the population believed EEC membership to be “a good thing”, 
after accession – which occurred in 1986 – the proportion rose up to above 70 per 
cent in the early 1990s (Moreira et al. 2010, 59). The decade and a half standing 
in-between accession to the EEC and the adoption of the common European 
currency was, indeed, a period of pervasive Euro-optimism. European structural 
and cohesion funds helped boost economic growth, and the country witnessed 
unprecedented social change (Barreto 2003). As a consequence, European inte-
gration almost disappeared as a primary topic of political competition at both the 
electoral and the parliamentary levels.4 The first decade of the Twenty-first centu-
ry, in turn, revealed signs of a slight erosion of the optimism on Europe. As Eu-
ropean financial aid was reallocated following the enlargement of the EU to the 
East, the benefits of membership became less palpable, and this seems to have 
had an impact on public opinion perceptions. For sure, Portuguese views on 
Europe remained, as a whole, very positive, but there are good reasons to believe 
that they are based upon a strictly utilitarian evaluation of the benefits derived 
from EU membership rather than on either strong feelings of attachment to the 
supranational European polity or an overall positive assessment of the EU’s 
institutional performance (Costa Pinto and Costa Lobo 2004). 
The 2007 IntUne surveys have, as expected, shown that the attitudes of the 
political (and economic) elites toward Europe remain also overwhelmingly 
positive, in Portugal (Moreira et al. 2010; Ruivo and Tavares de Almeida 2015) 
as well as in the other three Southern European countries included (Greece, 
Italy and Spain). The shared legacy of a relatively recent authoritarian past and 
of economic backwardness, which one sought to definitely leave behind, to-
gether with a positive perception of the experience as net beneficiaries of Euro-
pean funds, appeared to have led to the formation of a distinctively pro-
European region in terms of elite attitudes. As Conti et al. (Conti et al. 2010, 
112-13) have noted, “both political and economic elites in Southern Europe 
display a somewhat greater frequency of positions congruent with a strong pro-
Europeanism” and “show significantly lower frequencies on all Eurosceptical 
                                                             
4  After accession, even the communists tempered their stance. The radical demand of with-
drawal from the EEC was soon dropped, in favor of a call for “another”, more socially-
oriented Europe – a vision also shared by the emergent Left Bloc (Sanches and Pereira 
2010). On the opposite side of the political spectrum, the Eurosceptic turn of the Social 
Democratic Center (CDS) – renamed Popular Party (PP) – in the early 1990s lasted only for a 
brief period.  
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positions”. Still, there were some nuances within this group of countries. In 
fact, Spain stood out as the most consistent case of pro-Europeanism, whilst in 
the other three countries there arose some ambiguities. Portuguese parliamen-
tarians, in particular, were less enthusiastic – closer to the European-wide mean 
– about the prospect of further integration than their Southern European peers, 
and they shared with their Italian counterparts some doubts concerning the 
performance of EU institutions (Conti et al. 2010, 110, 114). 
Has – and if so, to what extent? – this picture changed as a result of the sov-
ereign debt crises in the Eurozone and the bail out? If, indeed, Portuguese 
attitudes on Europe are essentially based on a utilitarian assessment of the 
benefits of integration, one should expect a substantial drop in the indicators of 
pro-Europeanism after the crisis, since the latter has hit Portugal – and, for that 
matter, Southern Europe as a whole – much more severely than most European 
countries. Public opinion surveys point precisely in that direction. But do polit-
ical elites follow the lead of public opinion? Or does a gap arise between their 
attitudes and the masses’? Before we begin to tackle such questions, some 
theoretical remarks on the effects of the crisis on EU perceptions are in order. 
3.  Effects of the Crisis on the Perceptions of Europe: 
Theories and Hypotheses 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was followed by a global 
financial crisis with particularly acute effects in the peripheries – and especially 
in the Southern periphery – of the Eurozone. As interest rates on government 
bonds skyrocketed between 2009 and 2011, Ireland, Greece and Portugal were 
eventually obliged to request loans from the IMF and the EU. Attached to such 
financial assistance came a set of tough requirements, involving drastic cuts on 
public expenditure and a radical reform of the role of the state in the economy. 
Countries like Italy and Spain, in turn, were not formally “intervened”. Howev-
er, since they were spotted as risking contagion, their governments also caved 
in to the pressure to swiftly reduce debts and deficits through austerity 
measures. These events have challenged – and they still challenge – the legiti-
macy of the European Union. 
On the one hand, citizens see their national – and, in many cases, individual 
– economic conditions deteriorate as a result of the crisis. This poses a threat to 
the so-called “output legitimacy” of the EU, i. e. the delivery by the Union of 
what people most expect from it, namely economic growth. If mass support for 
the EU is indeed essentially utilitarian in nature – as it appears to be in Portugal 
–, then economic depression bears the potential to negatively affect it. And the 
broader question arises: can a supranational polity such as the EU, with well-
known unresolved problems concerning the democratic “inputs” to its complex 
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political system, afford to see the positive “outputs” it was perceived to gener-
ate regress dramatically (Bellamy 2010)? 
On the other hand, the economic crisis has also exposed the shrinking room 
of maneuver of national policy-makers. In the formally “intervened” countries, 
conditionality requirements included reforms of all branches of the public 
sector. These policies are perceived by the public opinion – and frequently 
presented as such both by the political elites and the media – as “dictated” by 
the IMF and the EU. In the countries that have not been officially bailed out, 
the pressure exerted upon decision-makers had very similar effects. Moreover, 
the EU adopted legislation and a new treaty to ensure debt and deficit reduc-
tion. Issues such as wages, corporate taxes and indexation of pensions have 
suddenly become central topics at the European level. This is quite remarkable, 
given the initial resistance from many Member States to discuss these topics in 
the past. There is, hence, a clear tendency driven by the Euro-crisis: a shift 
from the national to the EU level – a Europeanization – of many controversial 
areas of social and economic policy. Thus, austerity measures, unpopular by 
nature, are now associated in the public opinion’s mind to the European Union. 
Furthermore, as some governments find themselves in the position of agree-
ing to radical policy reforms with little reference to national parliaments or to 
citizens, there is also a clear transfer of decision-making power at the EU level 
away from the Commission and the European Parliament to the European 
Council – or, more precisely, to its larger, richer and more powerful members. 
This challenges the unity of Europe, which threatens to become fragmented 
along the lines of a simplistic divide between “good”, treaty-abiding countries 
and “bad”, financially irresponsible. 
Two distinct streams of research are helpful in determining which changes 
in attitudes towards Europe to expect in the aftermath of the crisis: literature 
which analyzes how economic conditions influence government support and 
research focusing on the determinants of Euroscepticism. They converge in 
expecting a decrease of support for the EU associated with the financial crisis. 
Economic voting theory argues that in bad economic times voters are much 
more likely to withdraw their support for the government (Lewis-Beck 1988). 
While some authors, in line with Easton’s (1965) argument, advocate that eco-
nomic slowdown affects support for incumbents, but not for the political system 
as such, others stress that a “deep-seated lack of confidence in the institutions” 
might jeopardize “the very foundations of the system of government” (Newton 
2008, 243). Analyzing the effects of the current crisis, Roth (2009) finds that net 
trust in the national governments and parliaments actually increased in the direct 
aftermath of the financial crisis – a phenomenon that resembles the so-called 
“rally around the flag” effect (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003). Yet this effect 
seems to be only temporary. As Roth (2009) notes, the medium-term effects of 
the crisis are significant losses of citizens’ trust in the national parliament and 
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government in the four periphery countries more severely hit by the financial 
turmoil in Europe (Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal). 
The implications of such findings for the problem of the impact of the crisis 
on attitudes towards Europe are, however, not straightforward. Many authors 
argue that support for national government is a good proxy of support for the 
EU. The idea is that citizens, because of limited information on politics at the 
European level, use their opinions based on domestic information as a proxy 
for support at the European level (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Hix 1999). In 
the context of the financial crisis, however, the assumption that citizens do not 
know much about European policies and their influence is quite hazardous: 
newspapers constantly report on decisions taken by the European Council and 
policy-makers directly associate austerity measures with conditions imposed by 
the European Union (and, in the case of “intervened” countries, by the IMF). It 
could then be argued that citizens are now more likely than ever to hold the EU 
responsible for deteriorating – national and individual – economic conditions, 
and that the economic crisis has now a direct effect on citizens’ attitudes to-
wards the EU. In other words, if as a rule citizens hold their government re-
sponsible for economic slowdown, then they might directly hold the EU – as a 
supranational government taking economic decisions – responsible, too. 
Although there is not much dialogue between this literature and the research 
dealing specifically with support for the EU, many findings of the latter con-
verge with the argument mentioned above. Let us recall Matthew Gabel’s 
(1998) seminal work, which tests five theories of public support for European 
integration. Gabel shows that the utilitarian theory, which posits that citizens’ 
support is positively related to their perceived welfare gains from integration 
policies, furnishes by far the strongest set of predictors of public support Eu-
rope – a finding later confirmed in the Portuguese case (Costa Pinto and Costa 
Lobo 2004). The logical argument for explaining (perceived) economic gains 
and EU support has been laid out by Fritz Scharpf (1999), and later on prob-
lematized by Richard Bellamy (2010). The point is that the EU appears to 
depend upon a type of “output-oriented legitimacy”, which is to say, a legiti-
macy based on interests rather than on identities. Hooghe and Marks (2005) 
used Eurobarometer data to measure the relative impact of economic aspects 
and of community identity on European public opinion, and found that both 
factors are important. Whilst identity has a more profound impact on the levels 
of trust in the EU than economic self-interest, the latter might be stronger in 
some particular conditions: “The economic approach to public opinion is likely 
to be most valid when economic consequences are perceived with some accu-
racy, when they are large enough to matter, and when the choice a person 
makes actually affects the outcome” (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 422). Two of 
these three conditions – accuracy of perception and saliency – are certainly 
present in the current crisis. Hence both theories – on government support and 
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support for the EU – converge into expecting a decrease of public opinion 
support as a consequence of the crisis. 
But can we expect MPs to respond to the financial crisis the same way the 
citizens they represent? Probably not, since the cognitive levels of voters and 
deputies concerning the structure and the political processes of the EU remain 
substantially different (Moury and de Sousa 2011). Public opinion perceptions 
are exogenous to the EU political system. Citizens organize their knowledge 
about Europe on the basis of abstract mental frames, fed by a variety of 
sources, with different degrees of sophistication and consistency (Kufer 2009). 
In contrast, deputies’ perceptions (institutional representations) are endogenous 
to the European political system, and for that reason they tend to express a 
more elaborate and informed vision of its modus operandi.  
Saying that, the literature does not offer clear answers as regards elites’ re-
action to the changes brought upon by the sovereign debt crisis. We know that 
elites are generally more pro-integration than their voters (Moury and De Sousa 
2011, Sanders and Toka 2013). Moreover, the cognitive – and less mutable – 
support for European integration, which fared poorly in Gabel’s (1998) study 
of public opinion, is likely to be stronger for MPs, and for the political elite as a 
whole, especially if deputies have been “socialized” in the European political 
circles (Scully 2005).  
On the other hand, MPs might also be sympathetic to the growing Euroscep-
ticism of their voters. Research has shown, indeed, that the positions held by 
elites and masses tend to influence each other (Sanders and Toka 2013). As 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks argue for populist parties: “Most mainstream 
parties continued to resist politicizing the issue. But a number of populist, non-
governing parties smelt blood. Their instinctive Euroscepticism was closer to 
the pulse of public opinion.” (2009, 21). However, important popular discon-
tent might also affect mainstream elites. As Marangoni and Russo noted (2016, 
1), this can happen in two ways. First, because members of the traditional elite 
may have changed their opinion under the influence of the recent events and 
popular discontent; or second, because representatives of traditional parties 
might have been replaced by an influx of more Eurosceptic colleagues.  
Finally, many authors have noted how southern European countries have 
seen their room of maneuver decreasing since the outbreak of the sovereign 
debt crisis. In a context of rapid changes in the yields of their national bonds, 
the ECB requested structural reforms in exchange for the purchase of public 
bonds or for the re-capitalization of national banks (see Sacchi 2015 for Italy; 
Zapatero 2013 for Spain; Sandbu 2015 for Ireland). With the new economic 
governance rules of 2010-13, moreover, the European Commission now super-
vises a large variety of national macroeconomic indicators, so its recommenda-
tions influence government medium-term spending plans, wages, taxes and 
labour code reforms (Bauer and Becker 2014). For Eurozone members, failure 
to comply with those recommendations risks sanctions that can only be averted 
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by a qualified majority vote in the Council. Even without such punishment, 
disapproving feedback from the Commission is allegedly taken into account by 
investors and hence increases the costs of non-compliance. In bailed out coun-
tries, finally, loans are conditional on reforms included in Memoranda of Un-
derstanding – which are drafted to the advantage of (the banking sector of) 
creditors’ countries (Sandbu 2015; Schimmelfennig 2015; Stiglitz 2016; Tsebe-
lis 2015). Given the changing environment in which MPs operate, thus, we do 
expect new cost-benefit calculation in their decision to support or not the EU.  
Thus, we should expect MPs in general, and especially those from the larg-
est governmental and pro-European parties, to show lower degree of commit-
ment towards EU integration than before the sovereign debt crisis. However, 
we also expect to find a large difference between mainstream and more radical 
parties, with the first showing a small decrease only of positive attitudes to-
wards the EU. The opposite might be true for MPs in the fringes of the political 
spectrum – in the Portuguese case, since there is no far-right populist party with 
parliamentary representation, particularly on the left.   
3.  Data and the Portuguese Case 
Our analysis relies on the data collected in the context of the ENEC project. In 
total, 81 MPs were surveyed in 2014, providing a comparable sample to the 
Intune rounds of 2007 (78) and 2009 (68). Some descriptive statistics of the 
surveyed MPs are in order. First, as Table 1 documents, the sample essentially 
mirrors the weight of each party in parliament. With 35 respondents, MPs elected 
in the lists of PSD (center-right) – the winner of 2011 legislative election – are 
the most represented group (43%), followed by those from the center-left PS (26 
respondents, 32%). The four smaller parties represented in parliament are all 
represented in the sample: 9 respondents represent the conservative CDS (11%), 
6 respondents from the PCP (communist) MPs, four respondents from the new 
left party BE (5%), and one respondent (1%) from the Green PEV, which typical-
ly runs for office in coalition with the PCP. Second, our sample is composed of 
57 (70%) male respondents and 24 (30%) female respondents. Only one of our 
respondents had not attained a college degree. Of the remaining 80, seven had 
completed a PhD. The most frequent field of study is Law, corresponding to 
nearly half (40) of the respondents, followed at distance by majors in social sci-
ences (16) and economics (10). Information about the sector of occupation prior 
to holding office is available for 68 respondents: 34 worked in the public sector, 
whereas the remaining half were overwhelmingly working in private services 
(32), and only two in private industry.  
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Table 1: Sample of Respondents to the 2014 ENEC Survey and Composition of 
Parliament by the Time of Data Collection 
 In sample In Parliament Political bloc 
Party name Freq. % Freq. %  
Centro Democrático Social (CDS) 9 11% 24 10% Conservatives 
Partido Social Democrata (PSD) 35 43% 108 47% Conservatives 
Bloco de Esquerda (BE) 4 5% 8 3% Left wing 
Partido Comunista Português (PCP) 6 7% 14 6% Left wing 
Partido Ecologista 'Os Verdes' (PEV) 1 1% 2 1% Left wing 
Partido Socialista (PS) 26 32% 74 32% Socialists 
Total 81 100 230 100  
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
The relative low number of MPs from parties other than the PS and PSD leads 
us to aggregate survey responses in terms of “political bloc”. These political 
blocs are not actual formal entities, but instead categories that we use for the 
purpose of making the most of our data. Specifically, through the analysis we 
group responses of MPs of PSD and CDS as “Conservatives”, on the one hand, 
and of PCP, PEV and BE as “Left wing”, on the other, whilst treating the data 
from the PS MPs separately (“Socialists”). In addition to increasing the number 
of respondents by category, there are two further reasons for proceeding in this 
fashion. First, despite the persistence of some historical issues between parties 
of each of these “political blocs”, a fine-grained assessment of the responses by 
each party encourages this approach, as throughout the analysis we find evi-
dence of robust intragroup coherence. Second, in recent years Portuguese poli-
tics has been structured as an interplay between these three groups.5 By the 
time of data collection, the country was governed by a majority conservative 
PSD/CDS coalition, which succeeded six years of socialist government – first 
with a parliamentary majority (2005-2009), and then as a minority government 
(2009-2011). Last but not least, given our interest in attitudes towards Europe, 
our scheme mirrors the distribution of representatives from each party in the 
European Parliament groups. Concretely, PSD and CDS are part of the Europe-
an People’s Party, the PS is a member of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats, and PCP and BE are both part of the European United Left-
Nordic Green Left (PEV is not represented in the European Parliament).  
                                                             
5  This deserves some reflection in the aftermath of the 2015 election, which was followed by 
the negotiation and signing of a set of unprecedented parliamentary agreements between 
the PS and the parties to its left, resulting in the nomination of a PS-led government. In the 
final section, we discuss some of the implications of our findings for the prospects of these 
agreements as of early 2016.  
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4.  Findings 
This section reports the results of the empirical analysis. Although we focus 
mostly on the responses to the 2014 survey, we engage in a longitudinal inquiry 
by taking into account data from 2007 and 2009. We assess the evolution of 
attitudes of Portuguese parliamentarians towards the EU by proceeding in four 
steps. First, from a general perspective, we check whether there has been an 
evolution in the proportion of MPs according to whom EU membership has 
benefited Portugal. Second, we assess the extent to which MPs trust in EU 
institutions. We then move to the perceptions about the crisis and the evalua-
tion of the role played by the EU in its management. Finally, we analyze how 
respondents look towards the future of the EU, in terms of the general dichot-
omy between deepening and reversing integration, on the one hand, and regard-
ing specific policy sectors and the future of the EU, on the other.  
Figure 1: Evaluation of EU Membership Overall Effects:  
“Has Portugal benefited from EU membership?” 
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to “Don’t know/Don’t Answer” and rounding. 
 
From a dichotomous and arguably crude point of view, a critical variable of 
interest for the purposes of our analysis is whether MPs consider that Portugal 
has benefited overall from its EU membership. In past surveys, this variable 
clearly showed the general enthusiasm of the Portuguese parliamentary elite with 
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the European project: in 2007 and 2009, around 93% of interviewed MPs agreed 
that membership benefited the country. In 2014, although slightly decreasing, the 
proportion was still overwhelmingly high: 89%. Figure 1 depicts this evolution.  
While the evaluation of the impact of the EU is one of several variables of 
interest, and although we deepen the analysis in the remainder of this section, it 
nevertheless bears stressing that despite the economic crisis and all the political 
and social controversy regarding the role of EU institutions in dealing with it, 
as much as nine out of ten MPs in the Portuguese parliament consider the EU 
to be overall positive to Portugal. From this perspective, the Portuguese par-
liamentary elite is still strongly “pro-Europe”, as it had clearly shown before 
(Moreira et al. 2010). 
Figure 2: Trust in three EU Institutions and Aggregate Score 
Note: The “Aggregate” time series is the product of a Principal Components Analysis, rescaled 
for a [0:10] interval, in order to allow comparisons with the original variables (see text for 
details). 
 
A second set of variables of interest is the extent to which MPs nurture a sen-
timent of trust vis-à-vis the EU institutions. As in the Intune surveys of 2007 
and 2009, respondents were asked about their level of trust towards three spe-
cific institutions: the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the 
European Council of Ministers. In order to extract a common trend among 
these variables we performed a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) which 
confirmed that levels of trust towards these three institutions are indeed jointly 
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correlated. A single component accounting for 78% of the variance (with an 
eigenvalue of 2.3) was extracted and labelled “Aggregate trust in EU institu-
tions”. As Figure 2 shows, the average value of this composite measure has 
decreased slightly from 6 in the two previous rounds to 5.7 in 2014. Interest-
ingly, the drop in the levels of trust towards EU institutions does not affect the 
three equally: trust towards the European Parliament remains constant regard-
ing 2007, whereas the levels of trust of the remaining two institutions decrease.  
This leads us to try to disentangle the sources of this evolution: does the de-
cline in trust towards (part of) the EU institutions originate in all the political 
spectrum? Or do MPs from different parties have different stances towards the 
European institutions? With Figure 3 we try to answer this question. We can 
see that it is in the Socialist Party (PS) that there is the steepest decline in the 
levels of overall trust, almost reaching the bottom half of the scale (5.3), down 
from 6.5 in 2007. A further look into the origins of this decline shows that it is 
caused mostly by the declining levels of confidence in the European Commis-
sion, which have a mean value of 4.7 within the surveyed Socialist MPs. We 
thus have evidence that within the PS, which has traditionally portrayed itself 
as the most pro-Europe of the Portuguese parties, there are signs of increasing 
discontent with the European Commission.  
Figure 3: Trust in EU Institutions (Aggregate Dimension), by Political Bloc 
 
So far, we have looked at general dispositions towards the EU. However, in 
2014, an assessment of European integration and its institution was inextricable 
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from the scenario described in section 3. By then, the European Commission 
and the European Central Bank were joining efforts along with the Internation-
al Monetary Fund to supervise the implementation of a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding which allowed for financial relief in exchange for the adoption of 
impacting austerity measures. How did Portuguese MPs evaluate the role 
played by the different European institutions in the management of the crisis? 
ENEC asked about the level of satisfaction in a [0:10] scale regarding the per-
formance of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
Council of Ministers. A principal component analysis shows how mutually 
related are the levels of appreciation for the performance of the three institu-
tions during the crisis. Extracting the resulting first component allows us to 
explain 82% of the variance (eigenvalue of 2.46). After rescaling this compo-
site variable into the original [0:10] interval we get an average evaluation of 4.5 
and a relatively high standard deviation of 2.1, showing considerable variance 
of evaluations. As expected, MPs from the parties in government show a higher 
appreciation of the management by the three institutions (mean evaluation of 
5.9), whilst the socialists (3.8) and especially the left wing (1) MPs are more 
critical. The composite indicator of trust in the EU institutions and the evalua-
tion of management during the crisis are highly correlated, with a Pearson’s r 
of 0.75.  
Figure 4: Evaluation of EU Institutions, by Political Group 
 
 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  187 
By now we have detected a consistent pattern in the 2014 data: MPs from the 
two parties in government tend to deposit higher levels of trust and appraisal of 
the EU in managing the economic crisis than their counterparts in opposition. 
Among the latter, MPs from left wing parties are more critical than those from 
the PS. But what future do individuals from these different groups envision for 
Europe? More specifically, do the different assessments among representatives 
from different parties regarding Europe translate into different approaches 
towards future European policy?  
Figure 5: Support for Further European Integration 
“EU … has gone too far (0) / should be strengthened (10)” 
 
 
We try to answer these questions in two steps. First we evaluate the extent to 
which respondents believe European integration should evolve in the future. In 
2007, 2009 and 2014, respondents were asked where they located themselves 
in a 0-10 scale, in which 0 implied that EU integration had gone too far and 10 
that it should be strengthened in the future. The mean response value evolved 
from 6.9 in 2007 to 6.4 in 2009, and reaches 6.6 in 2014. Overall, the slightly 
decreasing levels of trust in the EU do not coincide with a less enthusiastic 
approach towards European integration. In addition to showing this general 
trend, Figure 5 disentangles it into variations within the three political blocs. 
We thus observe that the steepest fall in support comes from the left wing par-
ties, from a 4 in 2009 to a considerably lower 1.3. Conversely, MPs from the 
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conservative parties are now more likely (7.3) than in 2009 (5.8) to consider 
that Europe should be strengthened, while the PS remains practically constant 
(from 7.5 to 7.7). Interestingly, MPs from the parties in government as well as 
those from the opposition PS – unlike MPs from left wing parties – converge in 
signaling that Europe should be strengthened.  
The next logical step is to ask what such deepening of European integration 
should look like. The Intune and ENEC surveys contain several questions as-
sessing the preferences of the elite members in this respect, which can be di-
vided in two groups. The first set of questions deals with the distribution of 
competences regarding different policy sectors: unemployment, immigration, 
environment, crime, health care and banking/finance regulation. For each of 
these sectors, MPs were asked about the level of government that should ideal-
ly be involved in managing it: whether the EU, national or regional authorities, 
or a combination of European and national/regional actors. The second group 
of questions concerns preferences regarding the delegation of policy attribu-
tions to the EU within a medium/long timespan. Concretely, respondents were 
asked to evaluate how in favour they would be regarding a set of hypothetical 
outcomes in a 10 year horizon: a unified tax system, common social security, a 
single foreign policy, larger support towards regions and the issuance of Euro-
bonds.  
Table 2 reproduces the answers to these questions in the context of the 2014 
wave. The most striking difference in policy preferences is between the left 
wing opposition, on the one hand, and the conservatives and socialists, on the 
other. Again, we can see that differences are wider between representatives of 
the left wing parties, on the one hand, and the two remaining blocs, on the 
other. The former tend to be more critical of attributing wider competences to 
the EU than the latter, regardless of the sector at stake: environment, health 
care, banking regulation, or immigration, for instance. Given the focus of this 
paper on the response to the crisis, one question seems particularly relevant. 
During the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding in Portugal, 
the virtues and perils of Eurobonds were often mentioned in public discourses 
and political discussions about the role of the EU and on how to deal with the 
coexistence between robust and fragile economies in the Eurozone. In such 
context, it is interesting to see that the issuance of Eurobonds is completely 
consensual among socialists, whereas about one quarter of MPs of the parties 
supporting the government did not endorse them; on the other hand, the left 
wing MPs are divided in half regarding their agreement with this policy.  
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Table 2: Policy Preferences of MPs from Different Political Groups 
 Conservatives Socialists Left wing Whole sample 
Unemployment policy should be mainly dealt at what level? 
EU  41% 65% 18% 46% 
EU and national/regional 34% 35% 27% 33% 
National / regional  23% 0% 55% 20% 
Immigration policy should be mainly dealt at what level? 
EU 75% 65% 18% 64% 
EU and national/regional 18% 23% 9% 19% 
National / regional  7% 12% 73% 17% 
Environment policy should be mainly dealt at what level? 
EU  66% 62% 36% 60% 
EU and national/regional 23% 31% 36% 27% 
National / regional  11% 8% 27% 12% 
Fighting against crime should be mainly dealt at what level? 
EU  41% 38% 9% 36% 
EU and national/regional 25% 38% 27% 30% 
National / regional  34% 23% 64% 35% 
Health care policy should be mainly dealt at what level? 
EU  14% 23% 0% 15% 
EU and national/regional 20% 31% 18% 23% 
National / regional  66% 46% 82% 62% 
Banking/finance sector regulation should be mainly dealt at what level? 
EU 80% 73% 27% 70% 
EU and national/regional 18% 27% 0% 19% 
National / regional  2% 0% 73% 11% 
In ten years there should be a unified tax system 
Agree somewhat/strongly 45% 23% 100% 46% 
Disagree somewhat/strongly 55% 77% 0% 54% 
In ten years there should be common social security 
Disagree somewhat/strongly 39% 19% 73% 37% 
Agree somewhat/strongly 59% 81% 27% 62% 
In ten years there should be a single foreign policy 
Disagree somewhat/strongly 5% 12% 82% 17% 
Agree somewhat/strongly 95% 88% 18% 83% 
In ten years there should be more help for regions 
Disagree somewhat/strongly 2% 0% 0% 1% 
Agree somewhat/strongly 98% 100% 100% 99% 
In ten years Eurobonds should be issued 
Disagree somewhat/strongly 23% 0% 45% 19% 
Agree somewhat/strongly 73% 100% 45% 78% 
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to “Don’t know”/Non-answers. 
 
From a longitudinal perspective, there are also some noteworthy developments 
regarding policy preferences, as Figure 6 documents. One of them should bear 
stressing: the Socialists were in 2014 much more prone to accepting that unem-
ployment should be addressed at the European level than they were in 2007 and 
2009. This contrasts with the MPs from the conservative parties in government, 
who show a divided stance regarding this issue, and the representatives of the 
left wing parties, which tend to favor a national approach. In the course of the 
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crisis and while the financial rescue package was in force, unemployment rose 
to record levels (Carneiro et al. 2014); as this happened, wide discussions were 
held not only regarding alternative routes towards job creation, but also about 
coping with the budgetary implications of unemployment. Discussions about 
sharing the burden of unemployment benefits in the context of the European 
Union were held during this period, which might explain the evolution of this 
trend.  
Figure 6: Preferences Regarding the Future of the EU 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this article we have framed and analyzed the evolution of the attitudes of 
Portuguese parliamentary elites towards the EU in the context of the global 
economic crisis and its intense effects in Southern Europe. Four final consider-
ations are in order.  
First, taking as points of comparison the previous data collections of 2007 
and 2009 (Moreira et al. 2010), political elite attitudes towards the EU did not 
change in a profound way with the crisis. While the data show that a higher 
proportion of MPs now exhibit lower levels of trust towards the European 
institutions, they also show that this fact does not correspond to a lower en-
gagement with the European project writ large. In other words, while distrust in 
the institutions has risen, attachment towards the European project has substan-
tively not. Therefore, as of 2014 the Portuguese parliamentary elite was still 
pro-Europe. While parliamentarians from the left wing parties constitute the 
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exception, it should be noted that they were already more critical towards the 
EU institutions in the previous rounds. 
It must be noted, however, that the questionnaires did not include views about 
the types of policy that should be undertaken at the EU level. What could be 
observed today, especially in the Socialist Party, is support to the EU combined 
with critics of the way it works and the political choices it embraces – such as a 
strict definition of the structural deficit or the weakening of the social Europe6.  
A third remark links our analysis with the resilience of the party system in the 
aftermath of the crisis. While this article deals with opinions at the elite level, we 
should not overlook the fact that a legislative election was held after data collec-
tion (October 4, 2015). Therefore, an external observer may wonder whether 
Eurosceptic political actors and organizations emerged and were successful chal-
lengers to the still relatively pro-European Portuguese elite. As a matter of fact, 
they did not. Indeed, the Portuguese election of 2015 was remarkable in the 
Southern European context inasmuch as it produced minor changes in the distri-
bution of power within Parliament (Giorgi and Santana-Pereira 2016). The rela-
tive weight of each party in Parliament did not suffer profound changes, and the 
only party that was able to get into Parliament for the first time with a single MP 
was PAN, which hails the protection of animals as its main cause.  
Finally, the ENEC survey also provides stimulating evidence in light of the 
developments in Portuguese politics immediately following the elections of 
2015. While the PSD/CDS coalition, which ruled from 2011 to 2015, managed 
to obtain a plurality of the votes in the election, it was not able to retain a ma-
jority of MPs. In an unprecedented political move, the PS leader, António 
Costa, was able to coalesce with the left wing parties BE, PCP and PEV, there-
fore achieving a majority of votes in Parliament to support a new PS-led execu-
tive. The left wing parties do not take part in government, but agreed to sustain 
the cabinet in exchange for important policy compromises. As of early 2016, 
this unprecedented “coalition” seems to be holding, having been able to ap-
prove its first fiscal budget. In this context, our analysis of the ENEC data 
reinforces a point that has been stressed by observers of Portuguese politics: a 
potential tension between the Socialists and the left wing parties supporting 
their government can be the divergent perspectives towards Europe. Concrete-
ly, a test to the resilience of this coalition can be expected should the EU insti-
tutions, as well as individual Member States, intensify the pressure for the 
executive to pursue austerity policies analogous to those from the PSD/CDS 
cabinet of 2011-2015, which were so heavily criticized by all the parties sup-
porting the current executive.  
                                                             
6  ‘Europeístas, mas críticos e reformistas’, Público, 22th May 2016, <https://www.publico.pt/ 
politica/noticia/europeistas-mas-criticos-e-reformistas-1732595>. 
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